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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Courts-Jurisdiction-Construction of Statutes Relative to Lands
Within State Acquired by Federal Government
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in the recent case of State
v. DeBerry,1 construed the statutes of this state pertinent to the juris-
diction of state and federal courts over lands within the state which
have been acquired by the federal government.2
The defendant was tried and convicted in the municipal court of
the city of Winston-Salem on a criminal charge of assault and battery
and was sentenced to thirty days on the roads. The assault had occurred
in the Federal courtroom in the Post Office Building in the city of
Winston-Salem; and the defendant, upon appeal to the Superior Court
of Forsyth County, entered a plea in abatement, for that the scene of
the alleged assault was on property over which the United States Gov-
ernment has exclusive jurisdiction. For the purposes of the plea it was
admitted that the federal government acquired the property in question
on July 28, 1899, and that acquisition was confirmed in 1900. The
motion to abate was denied, and the defendant took exception thereto
and appealed from an adverse judgment.
The Supreme Court held the motion to abate to be well founded,
but Chief Justice Stacy, in writing the opinion of the court, indicated
that the result which was reached, although governed by the pertinent
statutes and decisions, was clearly questionable in its desirability.
The authority of the federal government to accept and govern lands
within the boundaries of the sovereign states was conferred by the pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution that "Congress shall have power to
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district
. . . (District of Columbia) . . . and to exercise like authority over all
places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the same shall be,. for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-
yards, and other needful buildings." 3
Pursuant to this provision, the sovereign states have, through their
legislative bodies, enacted laws governing the cession of jurisdiction of
such lands to the federal government. It is the tendency of the wording
of these provisions to limit the authority of the federal government that
gives rise to cases necessitating construing of the statutes. The major
problems facing the courts in their interpretation of these statutes are:
(1) What type of cession is required by the provision of the Federal
Constitution? (2) What classes of structures, not specifically men-
tioned in the Federal Constitution, may be classed as "other needful
buildings?" (3) What manner and degree of jurisdiction may be re-
1224 N. C. 834, 32 S. E. (2d) 617 (1945).
2N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§104-1, 104-7.
11U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 17.
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tained by the states over lands so ceded without creating incompatibility
with the jurisdiction required for the purpose for which the land is
sought?
In general there are three methods of acquisition employed by the
federal government in acquiring lands within the states. The type of
acquisition known as the constitutional method is that expressly pro-
vided for by clause 17, section 8, article 1 of the Federal Constitution,
which method is purchase of private land by the federal government
from the owners, with the consent of the state wherein the land is
located. Acquisition by this method transfers to the federal government
such lominion as the consent statute confers, which in most cases is
subject to the single exception of the right by the state to serve crim-
inal and civil process through its officers. The second method is that
of purchase without obtaining the consent of the state, or by condem-
nation. In such a case the federal government owns the land thus ac-
quired in the same manner as would an individual, and the state has
full jurisdiction thereover for all purposes, with the exception that its
jurisdiction cannot be so exercised as to interfere with the essential
and necessary operations of the federal government. The third method
is that in which the land acquired by the federal government was the
property of the state, such acquisition being by a cession by the state
to the federal government in the nature of a gift. If such a method be
pursued, the state can annex any conditions or reservations to the ces-
sion as it may see fit; and if the federal government takes the land, it
accepts its subject to such conditions or reservations. 4
But what types of buildings, beyond the description "needful," were
intended by the framers of the Constitution when they recorded their
intention that lands so used should be under exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion as a result of mere purchase with state consent? Since those
structures specifically named in clause 17 of section 8 of article 1 are
predominantly military in character, it is not always facile to bring non-
military areas within the term "other needful buildings." However, a
clear majority of the courts include post offices within the term,5 and
North Carolina has so recognized them by specific mention within the
statutes bearing on the point.6
But, in arriving at its decision in the principal case, the North Car-
olina court was required to consider the third question; that of the
pertinence of our statutes concerning post offices as affecting the release
' Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 Atl. 729 (1926) ; cf. United States v. Tucker,
122 Fed. 518 (W. D. Ky., 1903).
'Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36, 28 Sup. Ct. 422, 52 L. ed. 670 (1908) ; Martin
v. House, 29 Fed. 694 (E. D. Ark., 1888) ; State ex rel. Jones v. Mack, 23 Nev.
359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897) ; People v. Marra, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 304 (1886).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§104-1, 104-7.
1945]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or reservation of jurisdiction over the lands so ceded. The initial legis-
lation, enacted in 1887, contained a provision conferring upon the fed-
eral government, without reservation, the authority to acquire title to
tracts of land on which were to be erected certain public buildings.
Among these buildings was the specific designation of post offices.7 No
additional legislation was forthcoming concerning such federal acquisi-
tion until the year 1905, when the legislature formulated a provision8
to reserve to the state concurrent jurisdiction with the federal govern-
ment over such lands for the service of civil and criminal process, and
for the pjunishment of all violations of the criminal laws of North Car-
olina which might be committed on such tracts of land as were covered
by the statute of 1887. This act of 1905 is still incorporated in our
General Statutes as section 104-1.
Two years later, in 1907, an act was passed which ceded to the fed-
eral government all jurisdiction over these lands, excepting only the
right to serve civil and criminal process. This provision made no men-
tion of the existence of the former acts, and is now section 104-7 of
our General Statutes.
Since none of these legislative acts makes reference to their applica-
bility to lands previously acquired by the federal government, the court
held in the principal case, under the general rule of construction, that
they must be prospective only.9 Thus, the law applicable to a partic-
ular parcel of federal land within the state would have to be that which
was in force at the time of the acquisition of the property.
Under this construction, and it appears legally sound, the law ap-
plicable to the post office building in the city of Winston-Salem, the
scene of the offense in the principal case, which site was acquired in
1899 while the act of 1887 was effective, would be that the federal gov-
ernment has exclusive jurisdiction. This is subject to the later con-
struction of the Supreme Court of the United States that even an
express cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government im-
plies a reservation of the right of service of state civil and criminal
process.
The undesirability of the situation becomes evident with the realiza-
tion that, following this line of reasoning, any property acquired by the
federal government within the state during the two-year period from
1905 to 1907 would be within the jurisdiction of the state courts while
all other lands acquired at any other time would be without such juris-
-diction. Thus, in the present case, had the defendant committed the
assault in another post office, the site of which had been ceded to the
7 Public and Private Laws of North Carolina, 1887, ch. 136.
RmvsAL OF 1905, §5426.
* Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C. 369, 151 S. E. 725 (1930) ; State v. Pridgen, 151
N. C. 651, 65 S. E. 617 (1909).
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federal government between 1905 and 1907 the offense would have been
justifiable in the criminal courts of this state.
That sections 104-1 and 104-7 of our General Statutes are in con-
flict is recognized by the court in the principal case. However, since
these statutes are prospective only, and since it must be recognized that
jurisdiction over lands once ceded cannot be limited at a later date,
such a situation seems inescapable.
It appears clear that while the act of 1907 remains in effect the
court will be forced to admit lack of jurisdiction over lands acquired
before 1905 or after 1907. The writer would agree that the principal
case is a lucid example of the undesirable result which the application
of this statute requires the court to reach.
Therefore, it is submitted that the legislature of North Carolina
enact into law a provision reserving to the courts of this state concur-
rent jurisdiction with the federal courts over violations of our criminal
laws occurring on such tracts of land hereafter acquired. It is clear that
in special cases where conditions exist for removal to federal courts the
federal judiciary will have jurisdiction over the cause, regardless of
whether it may accrue from occurrences taking place on lands privately
owned or owned by the state or federal governments. Therefore, the
reservation of concurrent jurisdiction over those indicted for crimes in
violation of our criminal laws would not create inconsistencies with the
purposes for which the land is acquired by the federal government, and
would facilitate the speedy adjudication of the ordinary cases arising
from the relations of inhabitants of the community.10
CHARLts F. CoiA, JR.
Mortgages and Security Trust Deeds-Sale Undet Power-Burden of
Proof as to Regularity-Recital in Trustee's Deed
The dissent of Barnhill, J. in Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v..
Boogher' charges the majority (Stacy, C. J., not participating) with
overthrowing sub silentio a well established and long followed rule in
this state as to burden of proving proper advertisement of a foreclosure2 *"
sale when the trustee's deed contains a recital of advertisement duly
made. The facts were these: on default in payment of money loaned
defendants by plaintiff insurance company and secured by a trust deed
of real property, the trustee advertised and sold the security to plain-
10 For a general discussion of jurisdiction over federal lands within the state
see Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. Rxv. 299.
1224 N. C. 563, 31 S. E. (2d) 771 (1944).
', The word "foreclosure" is for convenience used herein to include sales under
a power granted in the security instrument whether trust deed or mortgage, and
the words "mortgage' and "mortagor" are also used in a correspondingly enlarged
and somewhat inaccurate sense where it seems to make no difference.
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